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The Employment of Temporary Agency Workers in the UK: 
With or Against the Trade Unions?
* 
 
A firm's decision to employ agency workers may be perceived as a replacement of directly 
employed workers or as way to curb union power, which trade unions would oppose. 
Alternatively, trade unions may encourage the (temporary) employment of agency workers in 
a firm, if they manage to bargain higher wages for their members. We estimate the 
relationship between hiring agency workers and trade union activity at the workplace, in 
particular, the type of collective bargaining agreements. We use British data from the 
Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) of 1998 and 2004. The empirical 
association between the employment of agency workers and union strength is weak, but 
positive. Furthermore, workplaces with collective bargaining have lower wages in the 
presence of agency workers, suggesting that agency workers are hired against the unions. 
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Several studies have investigated rms' demand for agency workers and have stressed
the importance of cost reduction (e.g., Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Gramm and
Schnell, 2001) and the increase in exibility (Autor, 2003; Houseman, 2001).1 House-
man (2001) and Gramm and Schnell (2001) estimate a negative relationship between
the percentage of trade union members and the likelihood of a rm's employment
of agency workers. In contrast, Autor (2003) nds that agency employment experi-
enced a higher growth in US states where unionization levels declined more slowly
than in states where unionization declined more rapidly.
British trade unions are known for their resistance to temporary work agencies and
the perceived weakening of pay and conditions (Heery, 2004; TUC, 2003).2 British
trade unions have engaged with the question of agency work since the 1920s and the
British Trade Unions Council (TUC) rejected 'fee-charging employment agencies'
and advised its aliates to withdraw from all collective agreements with agency
suppliers (Heery, 2004). In the 1980s, the TUC changed the policy from demanding
the abolition of agencies to improved regulation, however, agencies were still consid-
ered\parasitic"and agency workers were seen as workers without legitimate interest
in obtaining such employment.
While trade unions seem to be most critical of the use of agency workers (TUC,
2003), their stance in a given rm on hiring agency workers is not clear a priori.
Agency workers may replace directly hired workers, which trade unions will clearly
oppose. However, if temporary agency workers are an important means to gain ex-
ibility, to save cost and to increase prots, trade unions should be able to extract
higher rents in rms that employ agency workers (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). A
rm that employs agency workers, either to save on labor costs or as an attempt to
weaken the union's bargaining power, may need to compensate (the remaining) di-
rectly hired workers for their cooperation. Fehr (1990b) shows that insiders (directly
hired workers) will cooperate with outsiders (agency workers) if they receive a wage
premium for their cooperation. The correlation between the employment of agency
workers and union power will thus be positive, rather than negative as suggested by
union rhetoric. Fehr (1990a) observes,\It is, however, not clear why insiders (union
1Other reasons include the response to shortage of (skilled) workers (Autor, 2003), the role of
human resource strategies (Purcell et al., 2004), or the extent of family-friendly work practices
Heywood, Siebert and Wei (2006).
2Trade union opposition to temporary work agencies is not restricted to British unions, e.g.,
Coe, Johns and Ward (2008) discuss the Australian situation, Olsen and Kalleberg (2004) compare
Norway and the US.
1workers) should object to the employment of some outsiders at a market clearing
wage if they are guaranteed their jobs and get a wage premium which gives them
a higher total income than they would have received through collective bargaining"
(p629).
A rm's decision to hire agency workers will depend, at least in part, on the unions'
bargaining power, which stems from labor turnover costs. These costs determine
the extent of substitution between directly hired and agency workers (Lindbeck and
Snower, 2002). The greater the union's bargaining power, the less protable it is for
rms to hire agency workers. The employment of agency workers permits rms to
realize higher prots because of a direct eect of lower wages for the agency workers
and an indirect eect that operates through the trade union's reduced bargaining
power, which reduces their wages. Agency workers will reduce the trade unions'
bargaining power, if only because agency workers are more dicult to recruit.3
These are the main hypotheses which we investigate below. Based on Fehr's
arguments, we expect to nd a positive correlation between the probability of hiring
agency workers and indicators of union activity. In the case that unions do not object
to the employment of agency workers, we expect to nd greater wages in workplaces
where there are both strong unions and agency workers than in unionized workplaces
with no agency workers. In contrast, if rms use agency workers to weaken the
union's bargaining power, we expect that (insiders') wages are lower in workplaces
with both strong unions and agency workers than in unionized workplaces with no
agency workers. As Fehr (1990b) argues, we also expect insiders' wages to be greater
in rms with agency workers than in rms where no agency workers are hired.4 As
shown by e.g., Willman and Bryson (2007), rms should also pay higher wages if
they bargain with trade unions over wages.
We use British data from the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys 1998 and
2004 (DTI, 2005) to analyze the relationship between the employment of agency
workers and trade union activity at the occupational level. The data provide infor-
mation for all occupations of a workplace on the type of bargaining structure and
whether or not temporary agency workers are employed in this occupation. These,
among with other detailed information at the occupation-, workplace- and worker-
3The most extreme example is probably the hiring of replacement workers during a strike|
which is legal in the US|, although the use of replacement workers does not occur often (Singh
and Jain, 2001).
4While we would like to compare the wages of directly hired workers and agency workers, no
such information is available in our data, because we observe only the using rm, but not the
agency where agency workers are paid.
2level, allow a unique assessment of the reasons for the hire of temporary agency
workers and the association with trade union activity.
Our main result from the empirical analyses is that the employment of agency
workers is, depending on the empirical specication and year, either not at all, or
positively associated with indicators of union activity. In particular, we nd that
in competitive sectors, where cost aspects are arguably more important than in less
competitive sectors, the employment of agency workers is positively associated with
union activity. This positive association is most likely the outcome of an attempt to
reduce union power as we nd that wages for workers are lower in workplaces where
we observe both collective bargaining and the employment of agency workers than
in workplaces with collective bargaining and no agency workers.
2 Data
We use British data from the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS)
1998 and 2004 (DTI, 1999, 2005) to analyze the relationship between trade union
activity and the use of agency workers. WERS is a nationally representative survey
of private and public sector rms. The 1998 survey sampled rms with ten or more
employees and the 2004 survey additionally covered rms with ve to nine employees.
We only use rms with ten or more employees in the 2004 sample and restrict our
sample to private sector rms in both years. WERS provides data on employment
relations and working life in Britain from three dierent perspectives, that of the
workplace manager's, from employee representatives and from a random sub-sample
of up to 25 employees per workplace. Our analysis is based on two cross-sectional
samples.5 These cross-sections provide information at the 1-digit occupational level,
allowing a unique assessment of the association between trade union activity and
the employment of agency workers at the occupation-level.
Descriptive evidence in Table 1 shows that in both years workplaces where man-
agers conrm to have collective bargaining with trade unions in at least one occu-
pation were more likely to hire agency workers than those where pay has been set
by management without consultation.
Figure 1 gives a view on the relative frequency of agency workers by occupation and
year. In 1998, agency workers were most frequently employed in clerical occupations,
5A random sub-sample of workplaces that have participated in the 1998 survey of workplace
managers were re-interviewed in 2004, providing two waves of panel data. However, the cross-
sections have larger sample sizes and managers were asked fewer questions in the panel than in the
cross-sectional survey in 2004.
3about 15 percent of workplaces with workers in the clerical occupation employed
agency workers in that occupation. Moreover, agency workers worked predominantly
as process, plant and machine operatives (10 percent), as associate professional
or technical workers (5 percent) and in elementary occupations (6 percent). By
2004, the percentage of workplaces using agency workers in clerical occupations had
dropped to 9 percent, whereas occupations related to personal services and sales or
customer services as well as professional occupations increased their use of agency
workers substantially.
3 Estimation strategy
Our estimation strategy consists of two parts: First, we estimate linear probability
models of hiring agency workers at the occupation-level. Second, we investigate
dierent hypotheses concerning this relationship by estimating wage regressions at
the individual level where we control for trade union activity, the employment of
agency workers, and the interaction between these variables at the occupation-level.
3.1 The probability of hiring agency workers
The occupation-level sample consists of 966 and 855 workplaces in 1998 and 2004.
We observe each workplace j-times, depending on the number of non-managerial
occupational groups j in the workplace f and end up with 2,664 (2,082) observations
for 1998 (2004). On average, each workplace has about three dierent occupational
groups, with a minimum of one and a maximum of seven observed occupational
groups per workplace. The linear probability model can be written as follows:
TAWfj =  +  Zfj +  TUfj + j + f + fj; (1)
where TAWfj is workplace f's probability to employ temporary agency workers in
occupation j, Zfj is a vector of characteristics measured at the occupational level,
TUfj is an indicator of trade union activity in a given rm and occupation, j is an
occupation-xed eect, f is a workplace-xed eect and fj is the error term. Since
there is no unconditional parametric estimator for xed-eects probit or logit mod-
els that yields consistent results (Wooldridge, 2002), we estimate linear probability
models with workplace-xed eects. As the majority of our regressors are binary
variables, OLS should provide the best linear approximation to the conditional ex-
pectation function (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Wooldridge, 2002).
4We use two dierent indicators of trade union activity, (i) whether wages in a
given occupation are determined by collective bargaining (at the industry-level, at
the organization-level or at the workplace-level) or not, and (ii) whether or not there
are union members in a given occupation in the worker's workplace. Note that the
information on trade union activity and agency workers is obtained for each of the
occupational groups in the workplace. Following B oheim and Booth (2004), we
consider managers' responses on trade union activity to be the better indicator than
workers' responses because workers might be less aware of whether or not there is a
recognized union at their workplace, particularly if they are non-members.
Firms may use temporary agency workers for various reasons, such as to increase
exibility, to reduce cost or to adjust stang levels to peaks in demand. We employ
workplace-xed eects to control for unobserved factors that make some rms more
likely to hire agency workers than others. Additionally, we control for a vector of
characteristics Zfj measured at the occupation-level in a given rm, such as the
importance of an occupational group as measured by the share of total employees
in the group, and the composition of the workforce as measured by the share of
female employees and the share of part-time employees.6 We also include variables
that measure the presence of xed-term contract employees in the same occupation
and workplace, the existence of work or joint consultative councils and the exis-
tence of a policy of guaranteed job security, which may imply higher labor turnover
cost. 7 Furthermore, we use variables that describe the payment scheme, such as
whether employees participate in a prot-related pay scheme, an individual or group
performance-related pay scheme, and whether they are eligible for an employee share
ownership scheme. We use two variables to control for the importance of specic
versus general human capital in an occupational group, these indicate whether the
rm conducts personality tests or performance tests when recruiting new workers.8
We have no plausible instrument to model the potential endogeneity of trade union
activity. There may be unobserved workplace or occupation-level characteristics that
make trade union activity and the employment of agency workers more likely in a
6We expect that the relative number of female (part-time) workers might be associated with
the decision to hire agency workers because of higher absence rates due to family responsibilities
(Ichino and Moretti, 2009).
7Work or joint consultative councils aim at discussing work- and pay-related issues between
managers and employees. Since work councils also exist in non-unionized rms, we expect that
this variable mainly captures the eect of employee involvement in non-unionized rms.
8Autor (2003) nds that agency workers predominantly work in occupations where general
skills are more important than rm-specic skills. This nding is consistent with the evidence that
agency workers receive less workplace training (Arulampalam et al., 2004; Booth et al., 2002), and
that temporary work agencies provide free general training and lower wages to induce self-selection
of high-ability workers and to facilitate worker screening (Autor, 2001).
5certain workplace or occupation. Since our indicators of trade union activity and
the use of agency workers are available for each 1-digit occupation, we can use a
within-rm estimator to dispel at least part of the endogeneity. The within-rm
estimator only uses variation across occupations within a workplace and controls
for all unobserved workplace characteristics that are constant across occupational
groups. However, this strategy does not remove endogeneity that is due to omitted
occupation-level characteristics. If there are unobserved occupation-level character-
istics that are correlated with trade union activity and the use of agency workers
in an occupational group, our estimates merely reect correlations. For example,
it might be possible that product market shocks have distinct eects on short-term
labor demand depending on the occupational group. If occupational groups with
more volatile labor demand are more likely to be unionized and to use agency work-
ers, workplace-xed eects is no solution to the endogeneity problem. Because more
volatile labor demand will generate more unstable employment patterns, and workers
with interrupted careers are more dicult to organize, we believe that this argument
is not problematic for our approach.9
We expect a negative relationship between trade union activity and the employ-
ment of agency workers, if the indirect eect that operates through the trade union's
reduced bargaining power outweighs the direct eect, provided that trade unions are
strong enough to fend o the hiring of agency workers. A positive association may
indicate that trade unions welcome the hiring of agency workers because they realize
a considerable rent for their members. Any relationship may also be due to reverse
causality, for example, it might well be that agency workers are hired to curb strong
trade unions or, alternatively, unions are not strong enough to prevent the hiring of
agency workers rather them condoning the hiring of agency workers.
Another explanation for a negative relationship between unionization and the hir-
ing of agency workers might be that high levels of temporary agency work lead to
more trade union activity. Brown, Bryson and Forth (2008) document the fall of
overall trade union recognition (for workplaces with more than 25 employees) from
about 24 percent in 1998 to about 22 in 2004. Table 2 shows that the percent-
age of workplaces where managers conrm to have collective bargaining with trade
unions in at least one occupational group has decreased from 16 percent in 1998 to
12 percent in 2004. A decrease can be observed for workplaces with and without
temporary agency workers, however, the fall in collective bargaining was greater
for workplaces with agency workers. Table 3 presents the mean fraction of union
9We are not aware of any empirical analysis of the relationship between trade union membership
and the variance of labor demand.
6members at workplaces with and without agency workers. Again, the decrease was
greater for workplaces with agency workers than for those with no such workers.10
Given this decrease in trade union activity, we consider high levels of temporary
agency work leading to more trade union activity as an unlikely explanation.
3.2 Wage regression
We further investigate the dierent hypotheses by estimating wage regressions at
the workers' level, where we control for trade union activity and the employment of
agency workers in a given occupation:11
lnwifj =  + Xifj + Zfj + (TU  TAW)fj + Ff + j + ifj; (2)
where wifj denotes the hourly wage of worker i employed at workplace f in occupa-
tion j, Xifj and Ff are vectors of individual and workplace characteristics, Zfj is a
vector of occupation-level characteristics, including TUfj (which is a binary variable
that indicates trade union activity in the worker's occupation and workplace) and
TAWfj (which is equal to one if agency workers are employed in the worker's occu-
pation), j is an occupation-xed eect and ifj is the error term. We also estimate
the model with workplace-xed eects. The interaction between TUfj and TAWfj
allows the comparison of four dierent workplaces, workplaces where neither col-
lective bargaining, nor agency work takes place (the base category) and workplaces
where we observe either collective bargaining, or agency workers, or both. Our esti-
mation sample consists of 10,448 workers in 1998 and 7,636 workers in 2004. Note
that the model of hiring agency workers, equation (1) is estimated only using these
occupational groups for which we observe workers in the worker-level sample used
to estimate the wage regressions.12 Since we do not observe a workplace or a worker
in both years, we estimate our regressions separately for each year.
If trade unions do not object to the hiring of agency workers, we expect that pay
levels for directly hired sta in unionized workplaces that use agency workers are
greater than in unionized workplaces where no agency workers are hired. Therefore,
we expect a positive coecient on the interaction between our indicator of trade
union activity and the presence of agency workers. On the other hand, if their
10We do not have a measure of union strength at the occupational level and cannot provide a
more detailed view.
11Wages are the insiders' wages, we have no information on the agency workers' wages.
12We also estimate equation (1) for all available occupational groups and obtain results that
are qualitatively similar to these presented here, but due to a larger sample size we obtain more
statistically signicant coecients. These results are available on request.
7bargaining power is not great enough to resist the hiring of agency workers, we expect
a negative coecient, i.e., unionized workplaces have lower wages in the presence of
agency workers. It should, however, be noted, that a clear causal interpretation of
the estimated coecients is not possible since we have no plausible instrument to
model the potential endogeneity of hiring agency workers, the decision to engage in
collective bargaining, and the paid wages.
We control for a wide range of characteristics measured at the individual-, the
occupation- and the workplace-level. Individual characteristics include character-
istics used in wage regressions, such as gender, age, ethnicity, tenure, occupation,
union membership, education, marital status and the presence of dependent chil-
dren. Occupation-level characteristics are those described above. We also control
for the industry and the region in which the workplace operates, the size of the
workplace, whether or not the workplace is under foreign ownership (51% or more),
and whether it is a single independent establishment or belongs to a larger organi-
zation. We expect that the current market situation determines whether a rm is
using agency workers or not and include variables in our regressions that measure
the competitive environment (whether the rm has ve or less competitors or faces
competition from more than ve competitors), the size of the market (local, regional,
national or international) and the current state of the market for the main product
(growing, mature, declining, turbulent).
Table 4 provides summary statistics of our sample by the type of workplace. We
see that the wages are on average greater in workplaces where agency workers are
hired than in those where there are no agency workers | and that no signicant
dierences are between them if we consider collective bargaining. Average wages
are lowest in workplaces where we observe neither collective bargaining nor agency
workers. The union density is greatest in workplaces with collective bargaining
and no agency work, about 63 percent of workers report being union members.
Workers in workplaces with collective bargaining and agency workers report a union
density of about 54 percent. In contrast, in workplaces where no collective bargaining
takes place only about 14 percent (with agency workers) and 11 percent (no agency
workers) of workers report being a union member.
When comparing the socioeconomic characteristics of the workers across the four
types of workplaces, we nd that workers in workplaces with collective bargaining are
more likely to be males, they are on average married more frequently, have depen-
dent children, are slightly older and have longer tenures than workers in workplaces
without collective bargaining. Workers in workplaces with collective bargaining and
no agency workers are more likely to be \blue-collar" workers (crafts, operatives)
8than in the workplaces with both CB and TAW, where clerical workers are the
largest group. Clerical workers are also the largest group in those workplaces where
there is no CB, but TAW. Notable is the higher incidence of temporary contracts in
workplaces where there is no collective bargaining compared to the workplaces with
collective bargaining.
4 Results
In Table 5 we present results from linear probability models of the use of tempo-
rary agency workers in private sector workplaces estimated at the occupation-level
(equation (1)).13
For each year, we present six dierent specications to investigate the association
between trade union activity and the probability of hiring agency workers. All
specications control for occupation- and workplace-xed eects (except columns (1)
and (7)). The rst two specications, columns (1)-(2) and (7)-(8) use our preferred
indicator for union activity, whether or not collective bargaining is used for wage
setting in the occupation. For both years, we do not nd statistically signicant
coecients, no matter if we control for workplace-xed eects or not. This implies
that we cannot reject the null that unions have no association with the hiring of
agency workers. A dierent measure of trade union activity, whether there are
union members in the respective occupational group, provides the same result, the
association between hiring agency workers is statistically insignicant in 1998 and
2004. (See columns (5) and (11).) Note however, that in both years most point
estimates are positive, i.e., we nd, if not a positive statistical signicant association,
certainly no negative association between the trade union strength and the hiring of
agency workers.
The information available in WERS allows us to look at the bargaining process
in more detail. Specication 3, columns (3) and (9), distinguishes between dif-
ferent forms of collective bargaining by the level of centralization (industry-level,
organization-level, workplace-level). Again, we nd neither in 1998 nor in 2004 any
statistically signicant associations between the propensity to hire agency workers
and the centralization level of bargaining.14 Specication 4, columns (4) and (10),
13We only tabulate the coecients on the variables central to our arguments. All other estimated
coecients correspond to earlier ndings, e.g., agency work is more prevalent in larger workplaces,
and are available on request.
14When we use all available occupational groups to estimate equation (1) we nd that collective
bargaining at the workplace level is statistically signicantly and positively associated with the
hiring of agency workers.
9uses the interaction between collective bargaining and information on the compet-
itiveness of the product market. The existence of rents in the product market is
a central condition for trade unions to achieve a wage (for their members) that is
above the market rate (Booth, 1995). If trade unions welcome the hiring of agency
workers, we expect that the association is stronger in rms that enjoy rents due
to a lack of competition in the product market. However, we nd the opposite,
workplaces with collective bargaining in markets with few competitors are less likely
to hire agency workers than workplaces with many competitors. This could be be-
cause more competition generally results in more pressure to reduce costs. The
estimated coecients are statistically insignicant for both types of workplaces in
2004, whereas in 1998, we do nd a dierence in the likelihood of hiring agency
workers between workplaces with ve or less and those with many competitors. Us-
ing the presence of union members in an occupational group as an indicator of trade
union activity yields the same results. (See specication 6 in columns (6) and (12).)
Results from the wage regressions are tabulated in Table 6 for 1998 and Table 7
for 2004.15 The interaction between trade union activity and agency workers allows
the comparison of four dierent workplaces, workplaces where neither collective
bargaining, nor agency work takes place (the base category) and workplaces where
we observe either collective bargaining, or agency workers, or both.16
In columns (1)-(3) we use collective bargaining as the indicator for trade union
activity. We present the estimates of the model without the interaction between
collective bargaining and the use of agency workers in column (1). We nd a sig-
nicant trade union wage premium of 3.2 percent in 1998 (statistically signicant
at the 10%-error level). The employment of agency workers is, however, not associ-
ated with higher or lower wages in either year. Adding the interaction term to the
specication yields dierent results and the estimates (column (2)) indicate that,
in 2004, there was a signicant wage premium of 6 percent for workers in occupa-
tions where agency workers were hired but wages were not determined by collective
bargaining. Collective bargaining is associated with a statistically signicant wage
premium in occupations without agency workers in both years (3.8 percent in 1998
and 4.7 percent in 2004). The interaction term shows how the trade union wage
premium diers between occupations with and without agency workers. For 2004,
we nd a statistically signicant negative eect of 9.1 percent, indicating that the
trade union wage premium is 9.1 percentage points lower in occupations with agency
15Detailed regression output is available on request.
16Note that the information on trade union activity and agency workers is obtained for each of
the occupational groups in the workplace.
10workers. This last result is evidence in favor of a view that agency workers are hired
to curb strong trade unions or that unions are not strong enough to prevent the
hiring of agency workers.
We replace the workplace characteristics by workplace-xed eects and nd a sig-
nicant trade union wage premium of 6.6 percent for occupations without agency
workers only in 1998. (Results are tabulated in column (3).) Although the other
estimated coecients are quantitatively lower and not statistically signicant, the
signs of the associations are the same as in the model with workplace characteristics
only. Columns (7)-(9) present the estimates from using the presence of union mem-
bers in an occupational group as the indicator of trade union activity, this yields
similar results to those obtained above.
Columns (4)-(6) take a closer look at the wage determination and we distinguish
between collective bargaining at the industry-level, the organization-level, and the
workplace-level. We nd a clear gradient in decentralized wage bargaining for work-
ers in occupations without agency workers. Wages are higher when collective bar-
gaining takes place at the workplace-level than when there is industry-wide bargain-
ing. This result is compatible with models where decentralized bargaining leads to
rent-sharing between rms and (strong) insiders, and where centralized bargaining,
through the union's stronger focus on employment, leads to more equalized wage
distributions (Barth and Zweim uller, 1995). However, the interaction terms between
CB and TAW indicate that especially workplaces with bargaining at the workplace
level have lower wages in the presence of agency workers. This, again, suggests
that unions did not benet from higher wages through the employment of agency
workers, contrary to Fehr's (1990a) arguments.
5 Conclusion
We use British data from the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys 1998 and
2004 (WERS) which provide information on workplaces, their workers and on the
human resource management for two cross-sections of British workplaces. We focus
on private sector rms and investigate the association between trade union activity
and the employment of temporary agency workers at the occupation-level.
We nd a weak positive association between the propensity of hiring agency work-
ers and union activity. This result appears puzzling as trade unions have been
adamant in their rejection of temporary work agencies, typically because they under-
cut terms and conditions, undermine collective bargaining and supply strikebreakers.
11In more detailed analysis, we have documented that in workplaces without agency
workers, trade unions appear strong as we nd a sizeable trade union wage premi-
ums. In contrast, wages are considerably lower in workplaces where we observe both
collective bargaining and the employment of agency workers.
We nd that in competitive sectors, where costs aspects are arguably more impor-
tant than in less competitive sectors, the employment of agency workers is positively
associated with union activity. This positive association is most likely the outcome
of an attempt to reduce union power as we nd that wages are lower in workplaces
where we observe both collective bargaining and the employment of agency workers
than in workplaces with collective bargaining and no agency workers. It should,
however, be noted, that a clear causal interpretation of our results is not possible
since the recognition of unions for bargaining purposes is not exogenous. An alter-
native interpretation of our results is that high levels of temporary agency work lead
to more trade union activity, however, given the decrease of trade union recognition,
we consider this to be an unlikely explanation.
The results indicate that the employment of agency workers is carried out against
the unions. Verma (2007) argues that it is the diculty of selling workplace con-
cessions politically that is the source of the resistance to workplace exibility. Our
estimates indicate that such an argument is justied as unions do not succeed in
obtaining a wage premium for their cooperation with agency workers, as suggested
by Fehr (1990a).
12Figures and tables17
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Table 1: Share of workplaces with agency workers in at least one occupation group
Year 1998 2004 
All workplaces 0.16 0.14 -9%
-Without CB 0.13 0.13 0%
-With CB 0.27 0.22 -21%
N 966 855
Note: CB=collective bargaining. Data from WERS 1998 and 2004 cross-sections. Private
sector workplaces with 10 or more employees. Estimates account for complex survey
design.
17Data from WERS 1998 and 2004 cross-sections. Only workplaces with 10 or more employees.
Estimates account for complex survey design.
13Table 2: Share of workplaces with collective bargaining in at least one occupation
group
Year 1998 2004 
All workplaces 0.16 0.12 -28%
-Without TAW 0.14 0.11 -24%
-With TAW 0.28 0.18 -38%
N 966 855
Note: TAW=temporary agency workers. Data from WERS 1998 and 2004 cross-sections.
Private sector workplaces with 10 or more employees. Estimates account for complex
survey design.
Table 3: Share of union members within workplaces
Year 1998 2004 
All workplaces 0.11 0.09 -16%
-Without TAW 0.10 0.09 -11%
-With TAW 0.14 0.10 -31%
N 966 855
Note: TAW=temporary agency workers. Data from WERS 1998 and 2004 cross-sections.
Private sector workplaces with 10 or more employees. Estimates account for complex
survey design.
14Table 4: Summary statistics.
without CB without CB CB CB
without TAW TAW without TAW TAW
mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd)
Individual-level characteristics (I=18,084):
Hourly wage (log) 1.76 1.97 1.92 1.99
(0.018) (0.031) (0.024) (0.036)
Union member 0.11 0.14 0.63 0.54
Female 0.50 0.52 0.31 0.48
Married 0.62 0.62 0.72 0.70
Dependent child 0.34 0.34 0.43 0.40
Bad health status 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05
Ethnicity:
White 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.93
Black 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Other 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05
Age:
Less than 20 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03
20-29 0.25 0.29 0.17 0.22
30-39 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.28
40-49 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.25
50-59 0.18 0.17 0.22 0.18
60 or more 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03
Education:
Postgraduate degree 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Degree or equivalent 0.14 0.17 0.08 0.13
A level or equivalent 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.14
O level or equivalent 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.32
Cse or equivalent 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.13
Other 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
None of these 0.26 0.20 0.32 0.21
Vocational training 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.45
Tenure:
Less than 1 year 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.14
1 to less than 2 years 0.15 0.16 0.09 0.10
2 to less than 5 years 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.23
5 to less than 10 years 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.20
10 years or more 0.18 0.19 0.38 0.33
Temporary contract 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.03
Training in last 12 months 0.55 0.57 0.51 0.60
Occupation:
Professional 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.06
Ass. professional and technical 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09
Clerical and secretarial 0.18 0.42 0.11 0.41
Craft and skilled service 0.12 0.06 0.22 0.09
Personal and protective service 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01
Sales 0.17 0.07 0.11 0.01
Operative 0.12 0.16 0.32 0.22
Elementary 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.11
Occupation-level characteristics (J=4,746):
Collective bargaining at industry-level 0 0 0.28 0.20
Collective bargaining at organisation-level 0 0 0.45 0.48
Collective bargaining at workplace-level 0 0 0.27 0.31
Union members 0.08 0.13 0.62 0.62
Continued on next page.
15Table 4 | continued from previous page.
without CB without CB CB CB
without TAW TAW without TAW TAW
mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd)
Work council 0.12 0.28 0.22 0.38
Fixed-term contract employees 0.11 0.18 0.09 0.26
Policy of guaranteed job security 0.06 0.03 0.16 0.25
Prot-related payments or bonuses 0.25 0.34 0.43 0.45
Performance-related pay schemes 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.28
Employee share ownership schemes 0.11 0.23 0.31 0.38
Performance tests 0.22 0.30 0.31 0.36
Personality tests 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.17
Share of part-time employees 0.28 0.18 0.23 0.15
(0.018) (0.027) (0.031) (0.036)
Share of female employees 0.53 0.60 0.40 0.52
(0.017) (0.030) (0.034) (0.049)
Percentage of employees 0.33 0.38 0.40 0.41
(0.010) (0.024) (0.023) (0.033)
Workplace-level characteristics (F=1,821):
Employment (log) 3.07 3.62 3.33 4.40
(0.027) (0.091) (0.102) (0.182)
Competition:
Five or less competitors 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.40
Many competitors 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.51
Missing 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.09
Current state of market for main product:
Growing 0.43 0.43 0.37 0.51
Mature 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.22
Declining 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.07
Turbulent 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.12
Missing 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.08
Market for main product:
Local 0.42 0.19 0.46 0.16
Regional 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.08
National 0.23 0.29 0.16 0.34
International 0.10 0.28 0.16 0.34
Missing 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.08
Single independent rm 0.49 0.36 0.18 0.05
Foreign owned/controlled 0.05 0.24 0.03 0.25
Industry:
Manufacturing 0.13 0.22 0.24 0.49
Electricity, gas and water 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Construction 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.02
Wholesale and retail 0.29 0.24 0.22 0.05
Hotels and restaurants 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.07
Transport and Communication 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.09
Financial services 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.14
Other business services 0.16 0.23 0.02 0.05
Education 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.00
Health 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.05
Other community services 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01
Non-trading sector 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.08
Region:
North East 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05
North West 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.10
Continued on next page.
16Table 4 | continued from previous page.
without CB without CB CB CB
without TAW TAW without TAW TAW
mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd)
Yorkshire & the Humber 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.20
East Midlands 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07
West Midlands 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.06
East of England 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.12
London 0.08 0.22 0.05 0.06
South East 0.18 0.23 0.13 0.19
South West 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.06
Scotland 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.06
Wales 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03
Note: CB=collective bargaining, TAW=temporary agency workers. Data from WERS 1998 and 2004 cross-sections.
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